Introduction
In recent years there has been considerable interest in the ways in which groups of market participants interact so as to facilitate international trade. Particular emphasis has been given in this research program to mechanisms to locate potential buyers and sellers and to overcome contract enforcement problems (Rauch, forthcoming) . Commission, in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland-to name some, and by no means all, of the jurisdictions involved (Kolasky, 2000) . Law firms with a global imprint can help clients obtain clearance from national antitrust authorities for mergers with, or takeovers of, foreign firms. Familiarity with both their clients needs and with overseas merger review procedures, which comes about in part by retaining skilled lawyers in offices abroad, can help add grease to the international market for corporate assets. Here, the impediments that networks help overcome are man-made, rather than the asymmetries of information emphasized in much of the literature on network formation and market outcomes.
Another feature of merger review is that some jurisdictions appear to give rival firms a greater role in presenting evidence against a proposed merger than others. It is often claimed that the European Commission's merger review procedure gives opponents to a proposed merger a greater role than in comparable U.S. proceedings (Venit and Kolasky, 2000; Boeder, 2000) . To the extent that this is true, global law firms can throw sand into the wheels of this form of global commerce, by presenting evidence against proposed transactions that are inimical to their clients' interests. A priori, then, it is unclear whether the spread of global legal networks has facilitated or retarded cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
A dataset detailing the overseas presence of 100 US law firms in 1997 is employed here to examine whether their geographical spread correlates with the pattern of overseas M&A by US corporations in 1999. Controlling for the other This paper is organized as follows. In the next section I summarize several aspects of the boom in global M&A activity in the mid-to-late 1990s, and the growth of US law firms' overseas operations since 1985. In section three, the econometric strategy and data employed are described, as are the estimation results. A discussion of these findings, their potential policy relevance, and suggestions for future research, is presented in section four.
The late 1990s boom in cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the international expansion of US law firms
The 1990s saw a ten-fold increase in the value of cross-border mergers and (Black, 2000) . Figure 1 provides evidence on the extent of US outward M&A activity, and shows that US purchases of corporate assets abroad trebled in real terms between 1995 and 1999.
Many factors are said to be responsible for this global wave of M&A. And liberalization of foreign direct investment regimes has no doubt played a role in facilitating overseas acquisitions of corporate assets, as has the ease with which firms were able to raise funds cheaply on stockmarkets in the late 1990s.
These developments have, of course, not gone unnoticed by antitrust officials around the world. As Table 1 These large global law firms were in place well before the global merger wave 
Econometric strategy and data employed
Given that many factors can influence the amount of US cross-border M&A received by a foreign country, one objective must be to adequately control for these factors and to examine how much of the remaining variation can be attributed to the presence of global legal networks. The first step taken was to assemble the largest possible dataset of economies which had received US Three other control variables were employed. The first is a proxy for the retained corporate profit rate (that is, the proportion of its profits a firm can expect to keep after paying taxes and other government-assessed fees and levies.) Economies which have higher retained profit rates are hypothesized to be more desirable places to undertake cross-border M&A. I proxy for this rate with one minus the maximum corporate tax rate charged in an economy, data on which is available in the World Development Indicators database. The second control variable is the foreign economy's tariff rate. The logic here is that higher tariffs reduce the profitability of exporting to an economy and enhance the attractiveness of establishing local subsidiaries. However, an alternative hypothesis is that national tariff rates proxy for the degree of policy-induced internal and external distortions to an economy, and to the extent that such internal distortions reduce the profitability of firms, this will discourage cross-border M&A. The first antitrust-related variable employed in the empirical analysis is whether the foreign economy has a merger notification scheme or merger review procedure. As argued in the last section, such schemes and reviews are likely to reduce the amount of cross-border M&A, especially for larger transactions. Before describing the first econometric specification employed it will be helpful to introduce the following notation:
MA The first two specifications estimated were: here, resulted in a two step estimation procedure being employed. In the first step, each specification was estimated using ordinary least squares and the absolute value of the regression residuals i e were recovered. The latter were used to weight each observation and the specifications were re-estimated. The full set of parameter estimates and their associated p-values are reported in Table 2 in for the regression with the total value of M&A activity as the dependent variable, and in Table 3 for the specification where the mean value of M&A transactions was the dependent variable.
Examining the two tables it is clear that the controls have, almost always, their expected signs. Richer economies that are closer to the United States, which have lower corporate tax rates and a British colonial heritage, tend to attract more US M&A. The large negative estimated parameter on the tariff terms suggests that they are indeed proxying for the extent of internal as well as external distortions to an economy and, on net, repel US M&A. As these control variables have little bearing on the main question at hand, and because their estimated parameters do not vary much across the specifications discussed below, I shall not discuss them further. In specification 1, the presence of a merger notification regime does not appear to influence the total value and mean value of US cross-border M&A. I will return to this finding later. Table 4 and Figure 2 ). For the purposes of exposition I refer to these six US law firms as the "Big 6" firms, and the goal of the remaining empirical analysis is to estimate what the contribution to an economy's receipt of US cross-border M&A is due to the presence of these six legal networks within its jurisdiction.
It is important to differentiate between the presence of these six law firms and the number of lawyers employed by US firms in a foreign economy. Although there may be a positive correlation between the former and the latter, the latter may The results are reported as specification 5 in Tables 2 and 3 . Interestingly, the controlling for the presence of these different legal networks also produces-for the first time in this study-negative and statistically significant estimates of the effects of merger notification schemes on US cross-border M&A. The relevant parameter estimate in Table 2 implies that national merger review schemes and procedures tend to cut inflows of US cross-border M&A in half-a sizeable reduction, which suggests that merger enforcement around the world had In other words, one would have to see some large changes in the fundamental determinants of 7 One alternative approach I considered was to include separate dummy variables for the presence of each of the Big Six firms. It turns out that there is significant collinearity between the dummy variables for the five smaller members of the Big Six, which means the estimated effect for each dummy variable would have been identified off at most a handful of countries-a highly unsatisfactory basis upon which to make inferences. 8 In my sample of 49 economies the mean corporate tax rate was 30.5 percent. 9 For comparison's sake, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations resulted in cut tariffs by industrial economies on manufactured goods by 2.1 percent.
cross-border M&A to compensate for the introduction of a merger review procedure.
The inclusion of these two network terms in specification 5 does suggest that these global legal networks significantly affect the extent of US cross-border
M&A A better sense of the net effect of these six legal networks on US cross-border M&A can be found in Table 5 . Using the estimated parameters in specification 5, and taking account of the appropriate covariances, I recovered the combined effect on each economy's receipt of US cross-border M&A of the presence of all six legal networks. At the 10 percent level (with one tailed tests), I found that all of the statistically significant estimates are positive-suggesting that on net these networks grease international transactions in corporate assets. What is more, the effects to be particularly pronounced in non-G7 economies, including developing economies such as Brazil. Chile, Hungary, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela-and reflects the fact that such nations have Baker & McKenzie offices and few (or no) large offices from the other Big Six firms. To the extent that such overseas M&A brings pressure to improve performance on domestic firms in these economies, then this may well be a positive development.
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Of course, to the extent that such M&A reduces competition in those nations' markets then the effects may not be so benign.
Summary and implications for future research
Much of the existing literature on the effects of networks on trade has emphasized the trade-facilitating aspects of network formation. In this paper I have considered the growth of legal networks where a proiri one cannot be certain that their spread has greased the wheel of one prominent form of international commerce, cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The existence of merger notification requirements and merger reviews provides law firms with an opportunity to present evidence that might go some way to convince antitrust authorities to oppose or demand changes to a transaction proposed by a rival to the law firms' US clients. I have presented evidence to suggest that for five US law firms with sizeable global reach this is, on net, exactly the consequence of their overseas operations. This paper's findings may have some implications for ongoing discussions between government officials, practitioners, and academics on international competition policy. The estimated parameters in specification 5, where I examined the differential effects of the Big Six firm's global networks and which is the specification that-in my view-best addresses the questions raised in this paper, suggest that national merger review regimes around the globe have now developed to such an extent that they have considerable bite. Specifically, my results imply that such regimes cut the total value of US overseas M&A in half. In the light of these results, one has to wonder whether the independent exercise of merger review by multiple jurisdictions is best serving US overseas commercial interests. Indeed, could it be the case that some US overseas M&A deals are being abandoned (or not even proposed in the first place) even when the anticipated adverse effects in a small number of jurisdictions are more than compensated by benefits-generated perhaps by efficiencies-in other jurisdictions? The lack of any formal or informal mechanism to balance the gains in one jurisdiction against losses in others could in part account for the large estimated effects of national merger regimes on overseas US M&A reported here. Given that national authorities are likely to vigorously guard their prerogatives and the current lack of sympathy towards creating such cross-jurisdictional mechanisms, the large M&A-reducing effects of national merger reviews found here suggest that-at a minimum-a thorough discussion of the appropriate substantive standards for merger reviews seems all the more urgent.
There are a number of important caveats to my analysis which should be borne in mind when interpreting these results. First, I am dissatisfied with the use of a single dummy variable to estimate the effects of merger reviews and notification procedures. Obviously these procedures differ across economies and, in future research, it would be desirable to explore which attributes of such reviews have the greatest effect on cross-border M&A. Second, given that not every overseas office (even those with 10 or more lawyers) of a US law firm is likely to be engaged in advising clients on cross-border M&A, my measure of each of the Big Six's global reach could probably be improved upon. Third, the cross-sectional analysis presented does not shed any light on how the impact of these global legal networks has changed over time-a deficiency that too could be remedied by future research. Finally, it is worth reiterating that there is no clear relationship between the value of US M&A that a nation receives and its economic well-being.
As discussed at the end of the last section, cross-border M&A can enhance or worsen the allocation of a nation's resources. The goal of this paper was, however, far more modest-to examine the positive (rather than normative)
impact of the presence of six large US legal networks. 
Number of deals
Percentage of deals Tables 2 and 3 were used to calculate these forecasts
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